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Abstract
The research proposed in this paper focuses on gathering evidence from devices with UNIX/Linux
systems (in particular on Ubuntu 14.04 and Android OS), and Windows 8.1, in order to find
artifacts left by cloud storage applications that suggests their use even after the deletion of the
applications. The work performed aims to expand upon the prior work done by other researches
in the field of cloud forensics and to show an example of analysis. We show where and what type
of data remnants can be found using our analysis and how this information can be used as
evidence in a digital forensic investigation.
Keywords: Cloud Storage Forensics, Cloud Application Artifacts, Data Remnants, Data Carving,
Digital Forensic Investigations.

1. INTRODUCTION
As we all noticed, in the last decade there was an exponential increase in the use of cloud
computing [1]. Unsurprisingly, this also led to an increase of cybercrime that involves the cloud
infrastructure, and therefore arose the need of cloud forensics [2]. This increase brought to light
many issues and challenges for digital forensics experts. In fact, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) identified 65 of these challenges that need to be addressed
[3]. There are two means to connect to one’s cloud storage account. The first is through the use
of a web browser and the second through a client application installed on the user’s device. This
research will analyze some of these client applications and provide some examples of how to
gather data. Since the previous work in this field analyzed applications such as Microsoft
OneDrive, Google Drive and Dropbox on a Windows 7 [4] [5] [6] [7], this research will show an
example of client application analysis on a Windows 8.1 operating system virtual machine created
with VMware Workstation 10. In addition, to diversify and provide different examples, the cloud
storage services that we selected are different from the one chosen by the authors in previous
work. Nevertheless, after testing these applications, we found that they represent valid
alternatives to the most known cloud storage services. These alternatives are Copy [8] and
ownCloud [9]. Dropbox was also analyzed, since unlike Copy and ownCloud it encrypts the files
that contain evidence, and it was interesting to compare the two different scenarios. To decrypt
some of the files, Dropbox Decryptor by Magnet Forensics was used [10]. No work so far has
been done on UNIX/Linux, even though UNIX/Linux-based operating systems are commonly
used as well, especially when providing applications on a server. The research proposed in this
paper expands upon the work done by prior research. The chosen operating system is one of the
most known debian-based Linux distributions, Ubuntu. It is very likely that in the most of the
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cases, a user downloads the client application on multiple devices. For example, the client
application can be downloaded on both a PC and a smartphone. Therefore, a second objective of
this research was to perform the gathering of evidence on a smartphone, in particular on Android
OS. There are multiple cloud storage services options on UNIX/Linux, however, not very
surprisingly, Microsoft OneDrive does not provide a client, and very surprisingly enough, at the
time of this writing, an official client of Google Drive has not been released for UNIX/Linux yet.
The work in this research has been therefore divided in two main parts. The first on Windows 8.1
and the second on UNIX/Linux. Finally, in the Conclusions and Future Work section, we will see
and compare the result between the two different operating systems.

2. PRIOR WORK
The following literature review, explores the procedures and approaches used by other
researchers in this particular field. Three main prior and related researches were analyzed to
discover the approach taken in order to collect artifacts. Artifacts collected can be files either
accessed or modified by the cloud storage applications on the client devices, or artifacts related
to web-based cloud storage services (which are accessed through a web browser). Two main
approaches were identified. The first approach represents a presumption of where artifacts
should be located on a device, and then perform a search in those specifics locations, based on
the examiner’s knowledge. Meanwhile, the second approach is based on the use of programs
and tools, such as Process Monitor from the Sysinternals Suite [11] to determine the location, in a
dynamic manner, of the artifacts and data remnants. All the prior work done in this field was
performed on a Windows 7 system using virtual machines. The following is a brief discussion of
the prior work.
The paper by H. Chung, J. Park, S. Lee and C. Kang [4] provides a procedure to investigate
devices such as PCs and smartphones. According to this procedure, the investigator collects and
analyzes data from all devices that a user has used to access a cloud storage service. Based on
the type of the device that is being analyzed, the procedure can take a different approach. Simply
put, if the device is a PC then it is very important to collect volatile data from physical memory (if
live forensic analysis is possible) and nonvolatile data such as files, directories, internet history,
and log files. Physical memory contains useful information about users and their activities. For
example, physical memory can contain login attempts and login credentials used to access cloud
storage accounts through a web browser. If the device is instead a smartphone, and if the system
is running Android OS, after rooting, it is possible to collect data from the main system folders. In
the case of an iPhone, after connecting the device to a PC, important data of user activity related
to the cloud can be found in backup files or in data synchronized with iTunes. Once all data is
collected an analysis in order to find useful artifacts is performed. According to the paper,
cloudstorage services can be web-based services accessed through a web browser or client
applications installed on the device. In the first case, it is essential for an expert to analyze data
such as web browser log and database files (cache, history, cookies, and downloaded files) that
are stored in the user profile directory on a Windows system. Cache files include downloaded
image files, text files, icons, HTML files, XML files, download times, and data sizes. History files
contain visited URLs, web pages titles, visit times, and the number of visits. Cookie files store
information about hosts, paths, cookies modification times, cookies expiration times, names, and
values. Download lists include local paths of downloaded files, URLs, file size, download times,
and whether downloaded files were successful. Through such web browser files an expert can
identify a user’s activity, including access or logins to a cloud storage service. However, when a
client application is installed on a Windows system, traces of it are left in the registry, log files and
database files. Mac systems have similar traces except registry files. These files are essential
during a digital forensic analysis, since they provide proof of the use of a cloud storage service.
These log files contain information such as logins attempts, if and when services were used, and
times of synchronized files. Database files contain information about synchronized folders and
files (creation times, last modified times, and whether files were deleted) on a PC. All this
information can be used to create a timeline of the user activity. In a smartphone device traces
are left in database files, XML files, and plist files (which contain information about a user
account). Finally, the rest of the paper provides examples of forensic analysis and shows where
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data is found on a PC or a smartphone. The cloud services that were used in this work, are
Amazon S3, Dropbox, Google Docs, and Evernote.
In the research work done by M. Katz and R. Montelbano [5], to obtain the locations of artifacts,
Process Monitor is used. The result is filtered to show the file system activity, and changes to the
registry and files. The cloud storage applications used in this research are SkyDrive (now
OneDrive), Dropbox, and Google Drive. When SkyDrive was installed 4959 artifacts were either
created or modified. Presence of the files modified using the client, was found in unallocated
space, $Recycle.Bin CSV files, pagefile.sys, and inside the AppData folder. In the case of
Dropbox installation, 4163 artifacts were either created or modified. Evidence of deleted files was
found in unallocated space and in pagefile.sys. During Google Drive installation, 9438 artifacts
where either created or modified. Evidence of files modified or deleted was found in unallocated
space, $Recycle.Bin CSV files, pagefile.sys, and configuration files. The result of this research
proved that a large number of files are affected during the installation of the application, and a
large number of files are left behind, once the uninstallation process is completed. Evidence of file
manipulation was mainly found in the unallocated space, $Recycle.Bin CSV files, and
pagefile.sys. The type and number of artifacts varied depending on the application, but evidence
of the use of the cloud application was still present after uninstallation of the client in all the
cases.
The following research, performed by D. Quick, B. Martini, and R. Choo [6], provides a well
formatted methodology and a very exhaustive analysis of data remnants left by cloud storage
applications. This research is performed on a Windows 7 machine and the cloud storage services
analyzed are Microsoft SkyDrive (again, now OneDrive), Dropbox, and Google Drive. The
objective of the research was to solve questions, such as, which data remains on the hard disk
after a user used the client software? Which data is left once the user has had access to the
cloud storage through a web browser? What is the location of the data remnants on the operating
system and in the memory? Other questions that were attempted to answer relate to network
traffic data and smartphones. Based on the work of this research, artifacts of files either access or
modified, and data remnants left behind by the applications are found inside prefetch files (which
are used to analyze the software activity, such as the number of times the software has run or the
associated files used by the application), registry files (they can contain references, activities,
settings or other information), link files (files’ shortcuts), thumbnails pictures within the
thumbcache, event logs (which contain information relating to system, software, and other events
recorded by the operating system), and finally, directory lists file ($MFT files). Forensic analysis
has been also performed on the memory, $Recycle.Bin (in order to find deleted files), client
applications (analysis of installation path, sample files, synchronized files and folders), on the
account accessed through a web browser (can contain information about the number and the
type of devices used to access the storage space), and finally, on the files related to the browser.
Network traffic was also captured and analyzed to find activity related to login sessions. To
conclude, data carving was performed through allocated and unallocated data. Thumbnails icons
and large size pictures were recovered. This research, used a dynamic approach: tools to
dynamically find evidence that were used were Process Monitor, Wireshark, among others.
Another research was performed by M. Epifani et al [7], on Microsoft SkyDrive (OneDrive),
Google Drive, Dropbox, and iCloud. Again in this case, the collection of artifacts left behind by the
applications was performed on a Windows 7 system. To track the disk usage DiskPulse was used
(to determine information related to created, modified and deleted files), Regshot, and
RegFromApp were used to track registry changes. By monitoring the registry changes,
researchers were able to obtain installation locations and installed client applications versions.
Other useful data was collected from configuration files present in the installation folder (inside
the user profile), from online accounts (information about deleted files, devices connected to the
account, version history for every file, and last browser sessions), from the memory (it can
contain user email, display name, filecache.dbx path, server time, file list, deleted files, username
and passwords in the case of a web-based storage access), from Hiberfil.sys and pagefile.sys,
link files, browser history and cache, registry point, and volume shadow copies. As we can see,
this research collected evidence from the same locations as the previous researches.
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To conclude this literature review, we can assert that the procedures and approaches taken in
these prior research works are in concordance with each other. Even if the approaches were of
two different types, the locations analyzed and the data remnants found were similar.

3. METHODOLOGY FOR WINDOWS 8.1
To perform this research and to gather data, both a static analysis and a dynamic analysis are
used. For example, the directory where all the information related to Google Chrome can be
found (databases, history files, cookies and so on) are analyzed in a static way. The database
files were accessed through SQLite Browser [12]. Then, the client application is installed. During
the installation, Process Monitor and Process Explorer are executed to find the locations on the
system that stores the main files and directories. It is possible to use the Process ID (PID) of the
process during the installation in Process Explorer, and use it as a filter parameter in Process
Monitor. Once the useful data is gathered during the installation, the application is removed and
the folders that were created during the installation process are controlled. To see if there is any
data remnant left, the registry is scanned with RegScanner [13] searching for strings that may
indicate the presence of evidence. In the section called “Recovering Deleted Files”, we will see
that data carving from the client applications is possible. To confirm this possibility, the TheSleuth
Kit [14] will be used.

4. MAIN RESEARCH FOR WINDOWS 8.1
As pointed out in the previous work section, there are two ways to connect to the cloud storage
account. The first way is through a Web browser, while the second one is through a client
application. It is important, therefore, to gather information in both cases. This sections contains
many different subsections that explain where evidence can be found on both the web browser
(Google Chrome), and in the main directories of client applications. Finally, the physical memory
contains a great source of useful data. Therefore, a subsection is dedicated to the volatile
information found in the memory.
4.1 Web Browser Analysis
C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default is the main directory
that contains Google Chrome files where evidence of accessing the cloud storage space through
Chrome can be found and contains the following described files. The table “cookies” inside the
database file Cookies, stores the creation times of the cookies, the host names, the names of the
cookies, the expiration times, the times of last access, and the encrypted value. The host name
field of the table contains the name of the website accessed, and here it is possible to find
evidence: in fact, some values are .dropbox.com, .google.com, .copy.com, onedrive.live.com, and
.owncloud.com. The creation times shows when the website was first accessed by the user, and
the time of last visit. The database file Favicons stores icons associated to websites, along with
URLs of the favicons. Among these URLs it is possible to find the cloud storage server address
plus the favicon path. One of the most interesting files in the directory above mentioned, is the
history database file. The table urls in this file stores the URL of the web pages visited, the titles
of the pages, the number of visits and the last visit times. The table downloads contains the
names of the downloaded files, the target paths on the local system, the start and end times of
download, the received bytes and total bytes counts, the servers addresses, the last modified
times, among many other useful information. The keyword_search_terms table contains the
keywords typed inside the browser search bar. The Login Data database file stores the logins
attempts and the server logins file paths, the types of the usernames (for example, a string
username or a login_email), the passwords types, the encrypted passwords value, the
timestamps and other information that can be useful during a digital forensic analysis.
The Network Action Predictor database file contains the URLs visited by the user. In order to load
web pages faster, based on the input text in the search bar typed by the user, the browser tries to
predict which webpage should be opened [15]. The QuotaManager database file can contain
reference to the same URLs. The Web Data database file stores the autofill table, which logs
usernames and other credential values and personal information, such as the location, address or
phone number of the user. The files Current Session, Current Tabs, Last Session, and Last Tabs
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could store a great source of valuable information since they collect all the sessions started and
the tabs opened by the user. This is in order to restore the sessions and tabs in case of an
unexpected crash of the browser. Other files that may contain evidence are History Provider
Cache, which appears to contain random strings and references to the user activity.
Once useful artifacts have been looked through the web browser files, it is important to analyze
the memory to see if it contains references to the user activities on the cloud storage accounts by
using the web browser. It was possible to find evidence inside the memory by simply taking a
snapshot of the state of the virtual machine, and then performing a keyword search (after
importing the .vmem file in a Linux machine, Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit) using the commands strings
and grep to filter the output. Inside the captured memory there is many useful information. In fact,
it is possible to locate in plain text user’s credential such as email addresses, usernames, user
IDs, first names and last names of the user, logins attempts, timestamps of logins, paths on the
server, server names or server addresses, lists of files accessed, creations times, times of last
synchronization, uploaded files and sizes, modification times, deletion times, messages and
actions taken by the server. For example using the keyword login, it is possible to see that a login
attempt has been made for both Dropbox and OneDrive.
4.2 Client Application Analysis: Copy
Launching Process Explorer when installing the Copy client application and when running it, we
can easily find where Copy stores the main files. In our case, the files are located in
C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Roaming\Copy\. The same result can be confirmed by using
the PID found in Process Explorer and using it as a filter parameter in Process Monitor.
The following are the important files found during the analysis:
config.db: this file stores settings such as the user email, first name, last name, and user
ID. It also contains the path of Copy’s root directory and the root cache, among other settings. trace.txt: this log file’s entries contain information regarding the hosting machine (operating
system, host information, etc.), the client application, and the server.
synclog.txt: this is another log file and it stores the operations executed by the application
along with timestamps and other information relative to the operations types. Some operations
are authentication attempts and file manipulation (such as upload, download, modification, and
deletion).
copy
<User_Email>.db
(in
our
case
the
name
of
the
file
is
cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com.db): this file is very interesting from a forensic point of view
since it contains the list of files and metadata stored in the root directory of Copy.
After uninstalling Copy, the main root folder is still present on the hard disk, as well as all the files
contained in the folder. The folder C:/Users/<User_Name>/AppData/Roaming/Copy is still
present, however config.db, trace.txt, synclog.txt and copy cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com.db
have been deleted. This means that after the uninstallation of Copy, evidence of use is still
present on the system and some user activity can be determined. Finally, by using RegScanner
we performed a search based on the string Copy, and it was possible to find some registry keys
left once is the application is removed and uninstalled. This strengthens the possibility for a
forensics expert to find evidence related to the use of the client application.
ownCloud
After installing and executing ownCloud for the first time, the output of Process Explorer is
checked. The main directory of ownCloud is stored in C:\Users\<User_Name>\ownCloud\. In this
directory the most interesting files are hidden, and are:
.csync_journal.db: this database file contains the metadata for the synchronized files. It
also stores in the table downloadinfo and uploadinfo, information regarding downloaded and
uploaded files.
.owncloudsync: this log file keeps track of the user and the application activity. Some
fields of the log entries are timestamps, duration of the actions, files involved, types of instruction,
working directories, size of files, file IDs, modification times, and so on.
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During the uninstallation of the ownCloud client application, the uninstaller asks the user whether
the ownCloud root folder should be deleted or not. If it is not deleted, then the files, database
files, and log files will still be available for analysis. Otherwise, they will be deleted. However, if
the hard disk has not been wiped, or the unallocated space overwritten, recovering these files is
still possible. This will be shown in one of the subsections of the Main Research section. Inside
the registry, after the client application is removed, there are not many references to ownCloud.
However, some traces are still left. In fact, the string ownCloud is still present in the AUTORUN
key.
4.3 Client Application Analysis: Dropbox
During Dropbox installation and execution, we started Process Explorer, which shows in the lower
pane, the files that Dropbox opens, reads and writes to. Unlike Copy, Dropbox encrypts the
configuration and database files, and does not release the decryption keys to the users. Due to
this reason, it is difficult to open and analyze these files. However, during a digital investigation,
and with the use of a proper warrant, investigators might be able to obtain the encryption keys
from the cloud service providers. Nevertheless, as the time of this writing, there is one particular
tool that allows to decrypt some of the files of Dropbox. The tool name is Magnet Forensics
Dropbox Decryptor (see the references for more information). To decrypt .dbx files (the encrypted
files) with Magnet Forensics Dropbox Decryptor the Dropbox’s .dbx file, the output folder where
the decrypted files will be stored, the Windows protection folder, the value of the registry key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER/NTUSER.DAT/SOFTWARE/DROPBOX/KS/CLIENT, and the user
Windows’s account password should be specified within the fields of the tool.
The most important files that can be analyzed during a forensic investigations are stored in the
folder C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Roaming\Dropbox\ and are contained in sub-directory
instance1 and are:
config.dbx: this file is one of the encrypted files, and after it has been decrypted with
Magnet Forensics Dropbox Decryptor it is possible to see that it stores the host IDs, the user’s
email addresses, the Dropbox root folder paths, among other settings.
filecache.dbx: the table file_journal stored in this file contains the server paths, the files
lists and the files names, the sizes of the files, the modification and creation times.
When Dropbox is uninstalled, the Dropbox root folder is still present on the disk, as well as all the
files contained in it. The folder, C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Roaming\Dropbox is still
present, however, the encrypted files have been deleted. There are also many registry keys and
traces left once the uninstallation of Dropbox is completed, that can be used as evidence of the
use of client application.
4.4 Deleted File Analysis
One important challenge that arises during a digital investigation, is the recovery of deleted files.
The unallocated space can store valuable information for an investigator and cannot be ignored
during an analysis. There are two methods to recover files deleted from the cloud storage
account: the first consists of recovering a deleted file from the server-side, while the second from
the client-side. In fact, both Copy and ownCloud client applications have a feature known as
undelete. This feature restores a deleted file both locally and on the server. The Dropbox client
does not have a similar feature, however, it allows to restore a deleted file or a modified file, once
the account has been accessed with a web browser and not through the application like Copy
and ownCloud. Dropbox also allows to permanently delete a file, in a way that it cannot be
restored.
In order to recover deleted files on the client, some basic understanding of the NTFS structure is
necessary. The NTFS file system maintains a table known as MFT (Master File Table), in which
each folder and file stored on the file system have an entry. The entries in the MFT table describe
the files metadata information and contain pointers to the clusters that contain the file’s data
content. When the files are saved onto the hard drive, both the entries inside the MFT and the
clusters that store the data are allocated [16].
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To attempt a recovery of deleted files, we decided to use TheSleuth Kit, which is installed by
default on a Kali Linux operating system. To attempt the deleted files recovery, we can either
image the Windows 8.1 operating system, or use VMWare Workstation to mount the hard drive
as read-only on the Kali Linux virtual machine. We chose to use the second option. Once the
hard drive is mounted, the command ls –ai, allows to list all files on the terminal, even the hidden
ones, along with their inode address. The inode address is an EXT file system concept, but it
basically has the same function as the MFT entry. Using ls –ai we were able find the entry
number for a file inside the MFT. The istat tool from the TheSleuth Kit prints in output the
metadata information, described in the MFT. In this output, the the clusters numbers are
specified. This clusters numbers are the pointers contained in MFT that point to the data content.
If we open the logical hard drive with a hex editor tool, such as HxD [17], we can prove that those
clusters really contains the file’s data. The hard drive is organized in sectors, so a conversion
from cluster to sectors is needed. Since in this version of Windows 8.1, there are 8 sectors per
cluster, we can use the following equation to find the sector address:
Sector = Cluster * Sectors_per_cluster

(1)

Inserting the cluster number and the number 8 (sectors per cluster) in (1) we obtain the sector
number, or the sector address. When opening the logical hard drive in HxD, this editor allows to
jump directly to the specified sector. This will confirm that the sector do in fact contain the data
content and it is allocated.
Going back to Kali Linux, now it is possible to use the blkstat tool from TheSleuth Kit, which
allows to see the allocation status of a specified data unit (in this case a cluster). As expected, the
clusters are allocated. The next step is to un-mount the hard disk, delete the file that was
contained in those clusters, and then mounting the drive again in Kali Linux, as read-only. We run
again istat on the same entry address and this time the output is different, since the entry header
says that the file is not allocated. Even if the file is deleted, the entry in the table is not deleted
and it still contains the metadata information of the deleted files. When a file is deleted, a Boolean
value is changed so the file system knows that the file is deleted and it is now unallocated.
However, the MFT entry still points to the clusters that contain the file’s data content. By running
the blkstat tool from the TheSleuth Kit toolkit, the output is also in this case different since now
the clusters are not allocated. Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the file is now in the
unallocated space. In addition, one can also deduce that when a file is deleted, both the entry and
the clusters still contain data (the file system can thought to be “lazy”, since it does not wipe the
content of the cluster). Unless the clusters that contain the file’s data content are wiped by a user,
or the clusters are over-written by the operating system, when a different file is stored on the
drive, the data content of the deleted file is still recoverable. A simple tool used to recover the
content inside the clusters is icat from the TheSleuth Kit. By using icat, the content of the clusters
is printed on output on the terminal. It is possible to redirect the output to a file and analyze the
file. The icat tool from the TheSleuth Kit is not the only tool an expert can use. There are plenty of
recovery tools, such as Foremost and Scalpel and they both represent excellent tools. Finally, to
prove that our deductions were correct, we open the drive again with a hex editor and then
access the first sector of the file, and confirm that the content is still there. This deleted file
recovery demonstration was executed on a file deleted from the Copy root folder, however, this
method works for every cloud storage client application installed and tested in this research.
4.5 Physical Memory Analysis
To analyze the memory, a snapshot of the Windows 8.1 virtual machine was taken and a keyword
search on the .vmem file was performed. Inside the memory there is a great deal of useful
information and evidence. However, performing a live analysis is not always possible, so there is
a possibility that memory cannot be analyzed when performing a digital forensic investigation.
Nevertheless, if a live acquisition of the memory is possible, then memory should be acquired.
Evidence that can be found inside the memory can include emails and user credentials, personal
details, passwords, file lists and file’s information, accessed files and folders, processes
information, processes instructions, host names, loaded libraries and modules, libraries imported
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through the server, temporary files, accessed database files and log files, log files entries,
authentication attempts, and so on.

5. METHODOLOGY FOR UNIX/LINUX
To perform our research, different programs and tools were used. VMWare Workstation 10 was
used to create a virtual machine of Ubuntu 14.04 (“Trusty Tahr”) 64-bit. Once the installation was
complete, a snapshot was taken in order to revert to a clean state once the analysis of the client
application was concluded. After the client application was installed, a keyword search on the
system was used to find the locations of the files and other artifacts. Specifically, the command
“find / -print | grep –i ‘keyword’” was executed on the terminal, and the output was filtered to
gather paths, files, and other artifacts. Unfortunately, there is not a version of Process Monitor
(from the Sysinternals Suite) for Linux. Nevertheless, the command lsof (list open file) can be
executed to list files opened by the client process, by using its PID. The tool used to acquire
memory is LiME [18]. In addition, a keyword search (using for example login credentials) on the
memory was performed in order to find artifacts.
Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit uses Ext4 as a default file system and to find where the locations of files on
the file system, TheSleuth Kit was used. In particular, the istat tool is useful to find inode
information, status of directories, and status about files inside the main directory that are created
by the cloud storage application in order to synchronize files with web-based the account. The
istat tool was also used to determine the group to which the inode belongs, and to find the block
address where the content of the data is stored. Using the dd command it is possible to create an
image of the partition or, as explained later, to image ranges of blocks and groups. The images
can be viewed with a hex editor. Foremost [19] is an example of a data carving tool that makes it
possible to recover deleted files. Finally, SQLite Browser was used to open database files
created by a web browser, such as Mozilla Firefox, or by cloud storage applications. The Android
OS analysis was performed on an Android OS x86 RC1 virtual machine.

6. MAIN RESEARCH FOR UNIX/LINUX
As pointed out in the previous work section, there are two means to connect to the cloud storage
account. The first is through a web browser, while the second is through a client application. It is
important, therefore, to gather information in both cases. This section contains many different
subsections that explain where evidence can be found on both Mozilla Firefox (which is installed
by default on Ubuntu operating systems), and in the main directories of the client applications. As
previously seen, another source of useful information is found on a running system inside the
physical memory. Therefore, a subsection is dedicated to the volatile information found in the
physical memory. One subsection will also briefly describe where other artifacts can be found on
the file system for all the applications and, finally, the last two subsections are dedicated to the
possibility of recovering deleted files, and the gathering of data on Android OS.
6.1 Web Browser Analysis
All the web-based accounts for all the applications were accessed through Mozilla Firefox and,
after operations such as uploading, deleting, and modifying files, the memory was captured and
analyzed. Inside the memory it is possible to find in plain text users’ credentials such as email
addresses, usernames and passwords in plain text, user IDs, first names, last names, logins
attempts, timestamps of logins, paths on the server, server names or addresses, references to
files accessed, timestamps of creation times, data of last synchronization, files uploaded, files
sizes, files modification times, files deletion times, messages and actions taken by the server.
Accessing the hidden folder inside the user’s home directory, by default named .mozilla, it is
possible to find database files that store useful information. The database file content-prefs.sqlite
contains preferred websites, such as the cloud storage websites accessed. The file cookies.sqlite
stores cookies that are created when the cloud storage website was accessed. The
formhistory.sqlite database file contains the history and tracks the websites visited by the user,
the number of visits, along with the last visited time. The database file places.sqlite contains
multiple tables where evidence of the use of the cloud storage services websites can be found.
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For example, the table moz_places stores the name of the server, paths, and files accessed on
the server, while the table moz_hosts and moz_favicon store hosts names and icons paths.
Finally, the file login.json stores logins attempts, hostnames, usernames, URLs of the forms in
which credentials were inserted, encrypted passwords, and MAC times. Inside the user’s home
directory, the hidden directory .cache contains thumbnails that show pictures of websites and
accounts accessed.
6.2 Client Application Analysis: Copy
When the Copy client application is executed it launches a process is called CopyAgent, which
functions as a background process and enables the application to properly run and execute its
operations. Once the location of the data remnants was found, by sorting through the artifacts, it
is possible to determine that the main evidence resides in the Copy main folder and the hidden
folder .copy, both present in the user’s home directory. The Copy main folder contains the files
that are synchronized with the account, a hidden folder called .copy-cache, which contains
temporary files (references to these files were found during the memory analysis), and a hidden
text file called .user_info, which does not contain any useful information. The hidden .copy folder
contains two directories: cache and resources, however they are both empty. The most
interesting information is contained in the following files: config.ini contains the host UUID, which
is an alphanumeric string of 32 characters; the file config.db contains settings, such as the root
cache path, the database version, the cloud server address, the root folder path, the
authentication token, the client ID, the user ID, the user first name, last name, email address, the
push token and push URL, among other settings. The file “copy <user_email>.db” (in this
research the email address used is cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com.db) contains a list of files
that are uploaded on the cloud storage space or the files that are synchronized with the local
folder. The file table in this database, contains the files metadata such as the file path, name,
parentID, volumeID, inode address, attributes, mtime, rstate, ctime, size, and child count. Other
tables in this database contain more useful information such as the owner ID and the file
fingerprint. The synclog.txt file, logs the application operations such as logins attempts, uploaded
files, deleted files, and modified files, along with other timestamps. Finally, the file trace.txt stores
information regarding the user, the process (CopyAgent), the operating system, and the server.
Another Copy configuration file is contained inside /home/rakesh/.config/Barracuda Networks,
Inc\Copy.conf. Once the client application is removed, the find command revealed folders and
files left on system. Since CopyAgent was never installed but simply run from the Copy client
downloaded folder, once it is removed, it will not delete the Copy main folder; however, a user
can simply delete the Copy main folder found in user’s home profile. If the user is not aware of
the hidden .copy folder, this will remain on the system, along with all the information contained,
which represents a great deal of useful information during a forensic analysis. Even if the Copy
main folder is deleted, both the inode entries and the data content are still present on the hard
disk, and unless it is wiped or the data is overwritten, recovery of deleted files is possible (see
Recovering Deleted Files subsection).
6.3 Client Application Analysis: ownCloud
Once the client application of ownCloud is installed, the main folder is by default present in the
user’s home directory. Unlike Copy, there is no hidden folder, but hidden files are present in the
client main folder inside the user’s home directory. This folder contains the files that are
synchronized with the account, along with the hidden database file .csync_journal.db. The table
metadata of the database file, stores valuable information regarding files, such as paths, inode
addresses, UIDs, GIDs, MAC times, md5 hashes, among other information,. The table version
contains the version of the client application. The hidden file .owncloudsync.log is a log file that
stores timestamps, operations executed by the application (instructions), the length of the
operations, the names of the files involved, MAC times, sizes, the file IDs, among other useful
information. The configuration file /home/<user name>/.local/share/data/ownCloud/owncloud.cfg
contains the URL of the ownCloud server, the username, authentication type (http), and other
settings. After removing the application, the files on the local system will still be present.
Therefore a user has to manually delete the ownCloud main directory. Unfortunately, from a
forensics point of view, the database containing the metadata and the log files, even if are hidden,
are removed with the directory, that includes also the stored files. However, inode entries and
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data content are still present on the hard disk, so as for Copy, unless it is wiped or overwritten,
recovery is still possible.
6.4 Client Application Analysis: Dropbox
Dropbox, unlike Copy and ownCloud, encrypts the database files and log files for security
purposes. The encryption keys are not released even to the user. However, a tool exists for
Windows versions that decrypts these files. Unfortunately, this tool does not have a counterpart
for UNIX/Linux, nevertheless, according to the Magnet Forensic team, a version of the decryptor
should be available for UNIX/Linux in the future [20]. Once the application is installed and the
account is set, the Dropbox main folder is created in the same location as Copy and ownCloud,
which is the user’s home directory. The main Dropbox folder maintains a hidden cache directory
that stores the files synchronized with the account. In addition to the main folder, there is a hidden
folder named .dropbox inside user’s home directory, which contains multiple interesting files and
sub-directories: a file named info.json stores the path of the dropbox root directory and the file
dropbox_pid that contains the Process ID, the sub-directory instance1 stores all the encrypted
files so it is not possible to collect evidence unless the files are first decrypted. One of these file,
is aggregation.dbx, contains timestamp values, server paths, and a blocklist value. The encrypted
files are config.dbx (contains configuration settings, user, host machine and server information),
deleted.dbx, filecache.dbx, (contains files metadata), notifications.dbx, sigstore.dbx,
PENDING_cHDqrT, TO_HASH_3WP99a, and UPDATE_XyrFxy. The folder instance_db stores
another encrypted file named instance.dbx. When uninstalled, Dropbox does not delete the main
Dropbox directory in the /home/rakesh folder. Even if the folder is deleted, a user might be
unaware of the presence of the hidden folder .dropbox, and this will be helpful if the database
files and logs can be decrypted. Like Copy and ownCloud deleted file are possible to recover.
6.5 Physical Memory Analysis
As mentioned in the Methodology section, physical memory was acquired using LiME and it was
analyzed with keyword searches. Volatile evidence found includes names of files present in the
application’s main folder, recently accessed folders, name and client application main process
information, process instructions (for example, in the case of Copy, copy-sync, copy-update,
copy-paused, or owncloud_init, owncloud_commit, owncloud_opendir in the case of owncloud,
etc.) icons paths, hosts names, loaded libraries and modules used by the process, libraries
imported through the server, temporary files created by the client application main process in the
respective application cache folders, database files accessed, log files accessed, log files entries,
logins attempts and credentials (for example, during the memory analysis after the use of Copy,
the string –Login-success U: ‘cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com’ was found.
6.6 File System Analysis
Several artifacts are found in various locations of the file system. However, most of these files are
not useful during a digital forensic investigation, but to only demonstrate the installation and use
of the client applications by the user. The directories /usr/share/man and /usr/share/doc on
Ubuntu contain the man pages and documentation of the applications, while the directories /bin/
and /usr/bin store executables or daemons files used to launch the applications. A great number
of icons related to the cloud storage applications are found inside /home/<user_name>/.icons.
Information can also be found inside systems logs: for example, the log auth.log inside /var/log
stores command issued on the terminal, along with the working directory and it can be used to
analyze the user recent activity. The log file /home/<user_name>/.bash_history contains a list of
the recently commands issued by the user. The dpkg.log contains references to packages
installed on the system, and it can reveal if any cloud storage client application was installed from
the commandline. Other possible locations that may contain useful evidence are the folders
/home/<user_name>/.local/share/Trash,
which
stores
deleted
files,
and
/home/rakesh/.cache/thumbnails, which contains thumbnails associated with the client
applications. If an application during its execution should crash, the syslog and kern.log files
found inside /var/log store references of the crash. The log file history.log contains the recently
installed packages and the command issued to install them, while term.log contains libraries used
to install the applications.
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6.7 Deleted File Analysis
It was well clear and established in the Prior Work section that it is possible to find artifacts of
cloud applications inside the unallocated space. Therefore, it is possible to recover the data
stored inside this space. This subsection will be dedicated to the recovery of deleted files, which
is a process known as data carving. Recovering deleted files can be done using two different
methods. The first is to recover the deleted files from the server, but it requires the application to
be logged in, or the account to be accessed through a web browser. Copy and ownCloud
applications both allow the user to recover deleted files with a feature known as ‘undelete’.
Dropbox does not have a similar feature, but it is possible to recover deleted files or previous
version of files on an account accessed through a web browser. However, unlike Copy and
ownCloud, Dropbox allows a permanent deletion option, that will permanently delete a file from
an account. The second way to recover deleted files is through the use of a data carving tool on
the local device. All the client applications analyzed in this research, when they first synchronized
with the server, downloaded a copy of each file and stored them locally. As mentioned earlier,
even if the files are deleted, the Ext4 file systems does not delete the inode entry, so both the
inode entries and the files’ data content are still present on the hard drive. To see how the
recovery is done, first we have to analyze how the file are allocated. Using the istat tool from the
TheSleuth Kit an examiner is able to find the inode addresses of the files, the group to which they
belong, and the block address of where the data content of the files is stored. The files are
usually (but not necesseraly) stored in contigous inode addresses. Using the blkstat tool on the
block addresses that contain the files’ data content, the output shows that the blocks are in fact
allocated. By executing the fsstat tool it is possible to find the inode range address of the group
and the range of the blocks where the data content is present (usually stored in a different group).
Using dd on these ranges it will allow a forensic expert to create a small image that can be further
analyzed with a hex editor. Now, we can examine if the files are still present once they are
deleted. After deleting the files, blkstat will return that the blocks that store the data content are
not allocated anymore. However, by opening the images with a hex editor, it is possible to
determine that the data is still present inside the block. In addition, the inode entries are still
present (a character has been added before the file name to indicate that the files pointed by the
inode have been deleted). At this point, using a simple data carving tool such as Foremost or icat
from the TheSleuth Kit, recovering the deleted files is fairly easy.
6.8 Android OS
A common feature of cloud storage services is that they allow multiple devices to be
synchronized. Therefore, it is very likely that one user will synchronize the same cloud storage
account on multiple devices. Thus, in order to gather as much data as possible, it is important to
analyze not only workstations, desktops, and laptops but also devices such as smartphones and
tablets. An operating systems that comes as default on many smartphone is Android OS. Client
applications were both available for Copy and Dropbox, however, an official client at the time of
the writing of this paper is not available for ownCloud. Nevertheless, an unofficial but very
efficient client application has been published by the BezKloboukuNos team [21]. In the case of
Copy the main files are found inside the folder /data/media/0/Android/data/com.copy/files. Among
these files, the configuration.ini file contains different configuration and account settings, while the
file copy.db stores names of the synchronized files along with the metadata of the files. The log
file trace.log stores information regarding logins, synchronized files, timestamps, account
information, and the client application’s process operations such as uploading, deleting and/or
modifying files. The download directory inside the temp subdirectory contains the files that were
locally saved, while the directory thumbnails-cache contains thumbnails. The file
com.copy_preferences.xml in the directory /data/data/com.copy/shared_prefs stores other useful
data such as the last opened file along with its timestamp. When the Copy application is deleted
from Android OS, all the files are also deleted. However, information about the use of the
application can be found in logs, such as logcat, which contains the system recent activity.
Operations and actions executed by the Copy application, files and directory accessed were
found inside logcat. ownCloud does not have an official client, but as mentioned above, an
unofficial client is available. Once the application is installed, the directory
/data/media/0/owncloudApp stores the sub-directory owncloud_user@server_address, which
stores files that were downloaded locally on the device. The database file named filelist in the
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folder /data/data/com.owncloud.androidApp/databases/ stores the list of the files synchronized
along with the type of the file, the username, server name and address. The file
com.owncloud.android/App_preferences.xml stores as well, the username and server address.
When the application is removed, the directory /data/media/0/owncloud still contains the files that
were locally stored, along with other temporary files. The rest of the files created by the
application are deleted. Also in this case, recent activity can be found in logs such as logcat. The
directory /data/data/com.dropbox.android/ stores local files, and the subdirectory databases
contains database files. Unfortunately, also in the case of Android OS most of these files are
encrypted. A file named 361753330-db.db inside the directory, stores the names of the
synchronized files, and the file prefs-shared.db stores account preferences. Finally, recent activity
of the user, including the use of Dropbox, can be found using logcat. A lack of analysis tools for
Android OS, did not let us perform a dynamic search to gather the useful data remnants. In fact,
the files above mentioned and listed were found through a manual search.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The first part of the research showed that it is possible to find plenty of evidence that relates to
the use of a cloud storage client application on Windows 8.1, and evidence that relates to the
activity of the user. These evidence is found mainly in databases and log files created by the
application, but it also can be found inside the browser if a desktop client application version is
not used, inside the memory, and inside the registry. If the application is then uninstalled, traces
of the use and evidence can be found inside the memory, system log files, and registry keys and
so on. If files are removed by the user there are two approaches that can help a forensic analyst
to recover them. Possible future work can consist in a forensic analysis on the server side of the
cloud, however, this is complicate issue since many problems arise, such as geography
impossibility (servers can be spanned all over the world) and the servers can be outside
jurisdiction of the investigators as well as a not transparent collaboration from the cloud service
providers. The second part of the research proposed in this paper, highlighted the main locations
and files on a client device with an Ubuntu 14.04, and more generally, a UNIX/Linux operating
system. Although the operating system is different, as well as the file system, the results obtained
by previous researches and the first part of this work, the results of this research are in
accordance and similarities arise. Differences arise due to the different feature of the Windows 7
and 8.1 operating systems and the UNIX/Linux OS, therefore locations and file types may vary. In
fact, the registry, which is a classic feature of Windows is not present on UNIX/Linux systems so
there will be no evidence related to it. Unfortunately, the amount of tools used to analyze
dynamically a process, such as Process Monitor does not have a valid counterpart for
UNIX/Linux, therefore a dynamical analysis to gather evidence is a bit harder. Nevertheless, it
was still possible to find evidence in the hidden directories or hidden files created by the
application, as well as in database or log files, inside web browser files, in the memory, and in
both allocated and unallocated space. Many other locations and files on the file system, such as
the cache, system logs, and configuration files stored useful data. Files stored on Android OS are
similar to the files stored on laptops or desktops. However, one big difference is that, in the case
of Ubuntu, the cloud application downloads and stores a copy of each file locally, while in the
case of Android OS, a copy of a file is stored locally only if the file is accessed by the user. The
fact that the files are stored locally, is really helpful during digital investigations since deleted files
and their metadata are still present on the hard disk, unless the unallocated space is wiped or
overwritten. Recently, most of the main cloud storage services, such as iCloud or Dropbox,
started to encrypt their files, which makes it harder for digital experts to gather useful evidence.
With a proper search warrant, the cloud service provider may be able to decrypt the files and
allow forensics experts to gather evidence. Another key factor that can be seen in this analysis, is
that even if the applications are different, the configuration files, database files, and log files (and
use of hidden files and directories, cache directories and temporary files, database and log files)
are similar. Finally, this research highlighted that a great deal of evidence can still be found on the
Ubuntu system once the application is uninstalled or simply removed.
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